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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAURINE ELG, , 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs. Case No. 14169 
BOYD FITZGERALD and 
VALLEY VIEW RIDING STABLES, t 
Defendants and Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
I STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The statement of the nature of the case is adequate as stated in 
plaintiff-appellant's Brief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants-respondents disagree with statements made by plaintiff-
appellant in her Brief as to the disposition in the lower court in that 
the court did in fact allow final argument at the conclusion of the trial, 
although said final argument was not recorded by the court recorder, and 
plaintiff-appellant's statement that no final argument was allowed was in 
error. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-respondents seek sustainment of the lower court's judgment 
of no cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants-respondents add the following facts: 
Pursuant to the testimony of Ronald Burke, a group of people had 
purchased tickets for a hayride and commenced arriving for a cocktail 
party at about 6:30 or 6:45 p.m. (Tr. 87: 7-16). The plaintiff-
appellant, MAURINE ELG, seated herself in the middle of the wagon, with 
her back against someone else's back. (Tr. 69: 8.15). That the horses 
were moving slowly at a walk. (Tr. 74: 7-9; Tr. 92: 1-14; Tr. 177: 9.17). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION AS 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 
It is this writer's opinion that it is totally improper to set forth 
matters which are held in chambers without a court reporter, as set forth 
by appellant in her first paragraph of Point I. However, since appellant 
has seen fit to mention the pre-trial conference, it is this writer's 
recollection that the court made a request from appellant's attorney as to 
whether he intended to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and 
appellant's counsel advised the court that he did not intend to rely on 
said doctrine, but that he intended to show specific negligence, and then 
outlined to the court what that negligence was. Counsel for the appellant 
in his Complaint does not plead res ipsa loquitur and did not during any 
part of the trial ever request the court to consider res ipsa loquitur, 
and if counsel for appellant believed the doctrine no longer existed in 
the state of Utah, that was his error, and at no time did respondents' 
counsel and/or the court advise appellant's counsel that there was no such 
doctrine in the state of Utah, and by any research of the subject, appellant's 
counsel would have been aware that said doctrine did exist* 
It is necessary that the appellant either in writing or a request to 
the court at trial make specific her request that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur be considered* The requirement that this be done was applied by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the following case: Joseph vs> W* H» Groves and 
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94 384 P. 2d 935: 
"We think one who wishes to rely on that doctrine, as well as 
specifically assigned acts of negligence, must so plead, either 
by separate count or proper allegation to the effect that the 
negligence to be inferred from the general situation caused the 
injury, thereby notifying the other party that he intends to rely 
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur*" 
There is nothing in the record or the pleadings which would indicate 
to respondents1 counsel and/or the court that the plaintiff-appellant 
intended to rely on anything but specific acts of negligence, and in fact 
that was all appellant did rely upon until the time of her Brief on Appeal. 
In the case of Wightman vs* Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 5 Utah 2d 
373, 302 P. 2d 471 472, the court set forth the necessary elements which 
must be present to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: 
"(1) That the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of 
events, would not have happened had due care been observed; (2) 
That it happened irrespective of any participation by the plaintiff; 
(3) That the cause thereof was something under the management or 
control of the defendant or for which it is responsible*" 
Based on the above definition, the evidence must show that the 
causation of the injury did not occur by the conduct of the plaintiff, 
third persons, or some other causation factors* 
From the testimony of the witnesses of appellant, there was no 
showing of any negligence on the part of defendants-respondents. There 
was only one witness, Eva Goins, who was watching the entire proceedings 
sitting on the seat by the driver. (Tr. 187: 26). Eva Goins was an 
employee of the Eagles (Tr. 186: 9.11), and testified that a guitar player 
who had been employed by the Eagles to play to the group was standing and 
said guitar player started to fall off the wagon at the point where the 
railing broke. (Tr. 189: 5.21). 
In other words, even if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was con. 
sidered, the no cause of action should be sustained on the basis that 
respondents1 evidence no longer warranted the application of the doctrine 
due to the fact that a third party was the causation factor which caused 
injuries to appellant. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH NEGLIGENCE 
AGAINST RESPONDENTS. 
It would appear from appellant's Point II and her statements from 
witnesses* we arrive that an accident occurred, and from said testimony 
that is basically all that can be arrived at, each witness having an 
entirely different idea as to what happened. 
As set forth in the testimony of Eva Goins, her explanation was 
that the guitar player fell and caused the railing to break, which 
basically was the only logical explanation of any witness. 
In Zoccolillo vs. Oregon Short Line R. Company, 53 Utah 39 177 P. 201, 
a passenger sought to recover from injuries allegedly suffered because the 
defendant carrier permitted the car in which she was riding to become 
unreasonably cold, the court stated: 
"It is fundamental that negligence is neither inferred nor presumed 
merely because a passenger was injured. Nor is negligence 
presumed as a matter of law. In that regard, negligence which 
constitutes a wrong, like fraud, must be established. It may, 
however, always be inferred from other facts and particularly in 
cases between carrier and passenger, where a collision or derail-
ment has occurred. It may be inferred from such occurrence, and 
where no explanation is offered in such a case the inference may 
be so strong as not only to justify, but to compel, a finding of 
negligence, which is the ultimate fact to be established. The 
circumstances surrounding the happenings of an accident, even on 
a railroad, may, however, easily be such that, while they may 
justify a finding of negligence, yet may not compel such a finding. 
In that regard, there is no difference in principle between a case 
where the maxim of res ipsa loquitur applies and where it does not; 
that is, an inference may arise from one or from a series of facts 
in any kind of a case which, if unexplained, may not only justify, 
but may also require, a finding of the ultimate fact of negligence. 
The only difference between an ordinary case and a case between 
carrier and passenger consists in the quantum of proof the 
plaintiff must adduce in order to make a prima facie case. True, 
courts in applying the maxim of res ipsa loquitur very frequently 
speak of the presumption which arises, etc. By reading the 
decision it, however, becomes clear that at least most writers 
refer to the presumption so called merely as an inference of fact, 
and not as a presumption requiring the court to direct a verdict, 
even though no explanation is offered.11 
Nowhere can this writer find any law which states that the burden 
of proof shifts, as appellant has alleged, and in this regard, in 
Angerman Co* Inc. vs. Edgemon et ux, 76 Utah 394, 290 P. 169, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"The effect of the maxim (res ipsa loquitur) is evidentiary 
and that where if applies negligence, which is the ultimate 
fact to be established, may be inferred from a particular 
occurrence or accident. In some cases, the inference may be 
so strong where no explanation is offered, as not only to justify, 
but to compel a finding of negligence; but ordinarily all that 
is meant by the maxim is that proof of the facts embraced within 
the statement of the rule affords reasonable evidence from which 
the jury, or the court, if the case be tried without a jury, may, 
in the absence of explanation by the defendant, infer that the 
injury arose from the defendant's want of care." 
The court sitting as a fact finder could determine that there was 
no negligence on the part of defendants-respondents and the accident 
occurred by the act of a third party* 
As stated in Joseph vs» W* H* Groves and Latter Day Saints Hospital, 
supra, the Utah Supreme Court states: 
"What the parties are entitled to and the law seeks to afford is an 
opportunity for one claiming a grievance which would justify legal 
redress to present it to a court or jury and to have a fair trial* 
When this is done and the verdict and judgment are entered, all 
presumptions are in favor of their validity*" 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the District Court 
should be affirmed* 
Respectfully submitted, 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents 
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